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As you all know, the organizers of this event chose a topic of burning
interest when they selected crypto-currency as the focus of this year’s panel.
Fortunately, unlike most of the similar events at which the author has been
asked to speak, we have not been asked to talk about Bitcoin as the currency
of the future; my doubts about the ability of Bitcoin to succeed as a currency
of routine use—as opposed to a speculative investment vehicle—dampen my
interest in talking repeatedly about that subject. The task they have set for the
speakers is one that involves a transactional development with much more
potential for widespread deployment: transactions in which lenders extend
loans in return for an interest in some form of crypto-currency as collateral.
That topic sidesteps the indeterminate speculation about the future de-
velopment of Bitcoin in favor of something of commercial immediacy.
Crypto-currencies, in fact, have present value on the balance sheets of com-
mercial borrowers, and all signs suggest that, in the years to come, invest-
ments in one or another form of crypto-currency will become more routine
and more substantial. To be sure, that value might be volatile, and it might or
might not be useful to think of it as currency, but from the perspective of
lenders, it represents value that would enhance the borrowing base of their
customers if lenders could capture it reliably.
This article considers that topic. The author proceeds in three steps.
First, the author considers the simple straightforward approach of perfecting
a security interest under existing legal rules. Recognizing the obvious weak-
nesses of that approach in cabining transfers of collateral to pseudonymous
purchasers, the author turns in the second part of the article to a more capa-
cious use of institutional arrangements that should give the lender a more
effective control of the asset—transactions using what the author calls
“quasi-control.” Finally, the third part of the article briefly considers techno-
logical advances that would use blockchain-based smart contracting tools to
perfect the lender’s interests more elegantly, namely the development of a
“smart” lien that integrates the respective rights of the borrower and lender
directly into the mechanism of the blockchain.
* Albert E. Cinelli Enterprise Professor of Law and Co-Director, Charles E.
Gerber Program in Transactional Studies, Columbia Law School. This article
was prepared for the spring 2018 panel of the Tsai Center for Law, Science &
Innovation. He is grateful for the opportunity to participate and acknowledge
the substantial advances in his thinking from the remarks of the other panelists
at that event and their discussion of his project.
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II. CONVENTIONAL PERFECTION
The most straightforward approach would perfect a security interest in
crypto-currency using the standard off-the-shelf rules of Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The author’s discussion of that topic can
be brief because application of those rules in this context is straightforward,
proceeding in two steps. First, the author considers where crypto-currency
would fall in the various types of collateral defined in Article 9. Second, the
author considers the potential methods of perfection available for that type of
asset under Article 9.
A. What Is It?
The author is, of course, not the first to consider how crypto-currencies
should be categorized for legal purposes. For Bitcoin in particular, the topic
already has arisen, provoking considerable debate under a variety of legal
regimes. For the most part, those debates have focused on the question
whether Bitcoin is or is not “money,” as opposed to some other asset. To the
extent that question has practical import,1 it is primarily because—at least if
Bitcoin is not “money” in the relevant understanding—those that receive and
dispense the currency are likely to owe taxes if the value of the currency rises
during the period that they own it. In any event, practical consequences aside,
regulators have mostly concluded that crypto-currencies are not money.2
1. To some degree, the import of the question is considerably more emotional
than it is practical, as proponents of crypto-currencies seem to take it as a per-
sonal slight when regulators or other legal decision makers conclude that a
particular crypto-currency does not warrant recognition as “money” under any
particular legal regime. The author’s students, for example, seem to generally
start from the premise that such determinations are more a demonstration of
ignorance of the “true” attributes of crypto-currency than they are an applica-
tion of longstanding legal categories to a newly arisen context. That is true
even when, as is often the case, the outcome exempts those that traffic in the
currency from burdensome obligations. See, e.g., Florida v. Espinosa, No. F-
14-2923 (Fla. Circuit Ct. July 22, 2016), https://www.morrisoncohen.com/site
Files/files/2014_02_06%20-%20Florida%20v_%20Espinoza.pdf (dismissing
criminal information arising out of Secret Service investigation on the ground
that transactions involving bitcoin were not subject to a variety of statutes re-
garding the transmission of money) (discussed in detail in Brandon Peck, Com-
ment, The Value of Cryptocurrencies: How Bitcoin Fares in the Pockets of
Federal and State Courts, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 191 (2017)).
2. E.g., IRS Notice 2014-21 (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-16_
IRB#NOT-2014-21 (concluding that bitcoin and similar “virtual” currencies
should be treated as property rather than money for federal tax purposes); IRS
Virtual Currency Guidance: Virtual Currency is Treated as Prop. for U.S. Fed-
eral Tax Purposes; General Rules for Property Transactions Apply, INTERNAL
REV. SERV. (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-virtual-curren
cy-guidance; see also infra note 10 (discussing deliberations of the Securities
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Whatever can be said for the clarity of those rules, it is much easier to
categorize crypto-currency under the U.C.C., which includes specific defini-
tions that leave little room for doubt as to the proper character of crypto-
currencies. On the first point, mainstream crypto-currencies, like Bitcoin, are
plainly not “money” under the U.C.C. because they are not “a medium of
exchange currently authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign
government.”3
That is not to say it is impossible for a crypto-currency to qualify as
“money.” For example, Venezuela began to issue a blockchain-based4 cur-
rency earlier this year, responding to hyperinflation of the country’s tradi-
tional currency.5 Similarly, Sweden’s central bank has given serious
consideration to offering a blockchain-based currency (e-krona) as a supple-
ment to, or even replacement of, its traditional currency.6 For the most part,
and Exchange Commission regarding treatment of initial coin offerings and
crypto-currencies as securities).
3. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24). As far as uniform laws go, the U.C.C.’s limitation of
the term to governmental currencies is not eccentric. See, e.g., UNIF. MONEY
SERV. ACT § 102(12) (“‘Money’ means a medium of exchange that is author-
ized or adopted by the United States or a foreign government. The term in-
cludes a monetary unit of account established by an intergovernmental
organization or by agreement between two or more governments.”). The re-
cently promulgated Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act is
the first uniform law to address the subject explicitly, drawing a distinction
between “legal tender” and “virtual currency.” Compare UNIF. REGULATION OF
VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUS. ACT § 102(8) (“‘Legal tender’ means a medium of
exchange or unit of value, including coin or paper money issued by the United
States or by another government.”), with § 102(23) (“‘Virtual currency’ means
(A) a digital representation of value that: (1) is used as a medium of exchange,
unit of account, or store of value; and (2) is not legal tender, whether or not
denominated in legal tender; and (B) does not include: (1) a transaction in
which a merchant grants value as part of an affinity or rewards program, which
value cannot be taken from or exchanged with the merchant for legal tender,
bank credit, or virtual currency; or (2) a digital representation of value issued
by or on behalf of the publisher and used within an online game, game plat-
form, or family of games sold by the same publisher or offered on the same
game platform.”).
4. In this article, the author uses the term “blockchain-based currency” to include
any currency issued on a blockchain, intending to include both currencies is-
sued by governmental entities as well as the more generally pseudonymous
private projects that I refer to as crypto-currencies.
5. See Kirk Semple & Nathaniel Popper, Venezuela Launches Virtual Currency,
Hoping to Resuscitate Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/02/20/world/americas/venezuela-petro-currency.html.
6. See Sveriges Riksbank, The Riksbank’s E-Krona Project, MONETARY L.F.
SWITZ. (Sept. 2017), http://www.swissmlf.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Rik-
sbank-ekrona-report-092017.pdf; see also Walter Engert & Ben S.C. Fung,
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though, and certainly with regard to the most well-known applications like
Bitcoin, crypto-currencies as they are used today are not “money” under the
U.C.C.’s definition.7
Recognizing that the IRS’s decision not to classify Bitcoin (and other
crypto-currencies) as “money” leads to their treatment as an investment asset,
I should explain that crypto-currencies also do not qualify as “investment
property” under Article 9. Article 9 limits that term to assets that qualify as
securities for purposes of U.C.C. Article 8.8 Article 8, in turn, limits the term
to assets that, among other things, represent “an obligation of an issuer or a
share, participation, or other interest in an issuer or in property or an enter-
prise of an issuer,”9 a limitation that excludes traditional crypto-currencies,
like Bitcoin, that reflect no obligation of or interest in any particular entity.
Again, there is nothing inherent in a blockchain that would prevent issu-
ers from using blockchain technology to maintain a registry of securities.
Indeed, the Securities and Exchange Commission has issued a detailed report
examining the circumstances under which an initial coin offering would be-
come a security for purposes of federal securities law.10 Still, notwithstanding
Central Bank Digital Currency: Motivations and Implications, BANK OF CAN.
(Nov. 2017), https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2017/11/staff-discussion-paper-
2017-16/ (discussing the rationales for issuance of such a currency). See gener-
ally Morten Bech & Rodney Garratt, Central Bank Cryptocurrencies, BIS Q.
REV. 55 (Sept. 2017) (academic typology of various initiatives in the area).
7. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(24).
8. Id. § 9-102(a)(49).
9. Id. § 8-102(a)(15); see id. § 8-102 cmt. 15 (explaining that for an asset to qual-
ify as a security “the interest or obligation [must] be fully transferable, in the
sense that the issuer either maintains transfer books or the obligation or interest
is represented by a certificate in bearer or registered form.”); id. § 8-201 (“[A]n
‘issuer’ includes a person that: (1) places or authorizes the placing of its name
on a security certificate . . . to evidence a share, participation, or other interest
in its property or in an enterprise, or to evidence its duty to perform an obliga-
tion represented by the certificate; (2) creates a share, participation, or other
interest in its property or in an enterprise, or undertakes an obligation; (3) di-
rectly or indirectly creates a fractional interest in its rights or property . . . ; or
(4) becomes responsible for . . . another person described as an issuer in this
section.”).
10. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81,207, 117 SEC DOCKET 5
(July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf. The
issue is not likely to go away, as current developments raise the possibility that
the currencies issued by Ethereum and Ripple might be securities. See Joon Ain
Wong, Is Ethereum a Security? The Answer Could Upend the Crypto World,
QUARTZ (May 3, 2018), https://qz.com/1262864/is-ethereum-is-a-security-the-
answer-could-upend-the-cryptocurrency-world/amp/; Ripple Hit with Class-Ac-
tion Suit over ‘Never Ending ICO’, PAYMENTSSOURCE (May 4, 2018), https://
www.paymentssource.com/articles/ripple-hit-with-class-action-suit-over-token-
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the burgeoning possibilities for intertwining blockchain-based currencies
with ongoing business investment opportunities, the fact remains that the
traditional currencies, like Bitcoin, reflect neither an “obligation” of any par-
ticular entity nor an interest in any cognizable entity or property. Rather, the
currency’s sole monetary value derives from the empirical likelihood that
others will value it.
In the end, then, it seems clear that traditional crypto-currencies would
qualify under Article 9 as “general intangibles,” the catch-all for assets that
Article 9 does not place in a different category.11
B. How to Perfect?
It is equally straightforward to determine how best to perfect under Arti-
cle 9. The first (and most traditional) possibility is possession.12 Not surpris-
ingly, given the impracticality of possessing assets that are intangible, Article
9 does not offer possession as a permissible method of perfection in general
intangibles.13 Nor does Article 9 offer the possibility of perfection by control,
which the revised Article 9 offers as an analogy to perfection by possession
for a variety of financial assets.14 Rather, perfection by control is limited to a
narrow and specifically enumerated group of assets: investment property, de-
posit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, and electronic chattel paper.15 Because
general intangibles (and thus crypto-currencies) fall beyond that enumera-
tion, the only method of perfection available under Article 9 is the residual
method: perfection by filing.16 Ordinarily, when the borrower is a registered
organization (such as a corporation, limited partnership, or limited liability
sales. For a skeptical perspective, see Jeff John Roberts, Is the SEC Gunning
for Ethereum and Ripple? Fat Chance, FORTUNE (May 1, 2018), http://fortune
.com/2018/05/01/sec-and-cryptocurrency-regulations.
11. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42). Having explained in the text why crypto-currencies or-
dinarily are not money or investment property, it seems superfluous to discuss
all of the other possibilities other than the residual treatment as a general intan-
gible. To the author’s eye, at least, all of those other undiscussed possibilities
seem plainly inapplicable. Just to be clear, though, the undiscussed possibilities
(listed in U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) in alphabetical order) are accounts, chattel pa-
per, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments,
letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, and oil, gas, or other minerals before
extraction. Id.
12. See generally GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
438–61 (1965).
13. U.C.C. § 9-313(a).
14. See RONALD J. MANN, COMMERCIAL FINANCE: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH
194–95 (2017).
15. U.C.C. § 9-314(a).
16. Id. § 9-310(a).
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company), perfection by filing would be accomplished by a filing in the state
under the laws of which the borrower was organized.17
C. Reliability?
However simple and straightforward the above analysis might be, it
only starts the transactional inquiry, because the lender advancing funds
against crypto-currency as collateral would hardly be satisfied by knowing
that its security interest will be perfected under applicable law. It will be
much more interested to know how sure it can be that the collateral will be
available as a source of repayment if the borrower fails to repay the loan as
agreed. Thus, if the borrower can freely dispose of the collateral without the
lender’s consent, then the lender’s security interest is of little practical value
even if it is valid, binding, and enforceable as a legal matter.18
Article 9 recognizes and responds to that problem as well as it can,
unconditionally providing that a security interest “continues in collateral not-
withstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition [of the collat-
eral] unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security
interest.”19 The principle that a security interest passes through a sale unaf-
fected is important, of course, but it does not help the lender much for collat-
eral that the borrower can readily transfer beyond the lender’s reach.
Unfortunately, the context of crypto-currencies raises just such problem be-
cause the inherently pseudonymous nature of blockchain transfers for ex-
17. The statute’s delineation of that rule is remarkably circuitous. Under U.C.C.
§ 9-301(1), the effect of perfection or non-perfection in collateral is determined
under the “local law” of the jurisdiction in which a borrower “is located.” In
context, that means that the question of whether a lender has perfected in a
borrower’s collateral depends upon the filing records of the jurisdiction of the
borrower’s location. See id. § 9-301 cmts. 3 & 4; id. § 9-307 cmt. 4. Under
U.C.C. § 9-307(e), a “registered organization that is organized under the laws
of a State is located in that State.” Finally, U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(71) defines “reg-
istered organization” to include “an organization organized solely under the
law of a single State . . . by the filing of a public organic record with . . . the
State.” See id. § 9-102 cmt. 11 (explaining that a general partnership is not a
registered organization “because such a partnership is not formed or organized
by the filing of a record with . . . the State,” but that “[i]n contrast, corpora-
tions, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships ordinarily are ‘regis-
tered organizations’”).
18. As the author has explained, the lender will often have other reasons for want-
ing control of an asset as collateral, such as maintaining leverage over the bor-
rower and limiting future borrowings that would dilute the interest of the
lender. See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110
HARV. L. REV. 625, 639–58 (1997). Those interests in collateral also would be
vitiated were the borrower freely able to dispose of the collateral.
19. U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(1).
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isting crypto-currencies, like Bitcoin,20 make it trivially easy for a borrower
to transfer assets to an entity that is difficult, if not practically impossible,21
for the lender to identify or locate.22 So, even if the borrower has granted a
first-priority perfected security interest to a lender, a lender’s superior right
in the crypto-currency will be of no use if the lender cannot identify the
entity or individual from the public key used to identify the purchaser in the
blockchain ledger. Moreover, even if the lender can identify the purchaser,
location in a remote jurisdiction might make enforcement impractical—either
because the jurisdiction declines to recognize the priority of the lender’s in-
terest or because of the increased costs of litigation in a forum remote from
the lender’s expectations.
In a nutshell, Article 9 offers a straightforward and reliable method of
legal protection that may well afford little in the way of reliable potential for
enforcement. The author’s task in the next section is to explore whether an
alternate transactional design might afford lenders more reliable access to
their collateral.
III. QUASI-CONTROL
The previous section treated the transactional form as a given—the bor-
rower grants a security interest in a conventional security agreement, and the
lender perfects that security interest in the ordinary course with a routine
financing statement. The relative ineffectiveness of that approach will sur-
prise no one with experience in arranging commercial finance transactions. It
is commonplace for the off-the-shelf procedures that Article 9 has offered
through the years to fall short of the protections that informed lenders would
seek for their collateral. The question of interest, and the subject of this part
of the article, is how best to design a transaction that affords the protections
lacking in the simple transaction analyzed above.
20. See, e.g., Kevin V. Tu, Crypto-Collateral, 21 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (discussing pseudonymity of transfers on blockchain).
21. To be sure, transactions in cryptocurrencies are not nearly as anonymous as
press reports suggest, and advances in “de-anonymization” techniques are en-
hancing the ability of investigators (principally law enforcement authorities) to
identify those who have engaged in past transactions in crypto-currency. See,
e.g., Steven Goldfeder et al., When the Cookie Meets the Blockchain: Privacy
Risks of Web Payments via Cryptocurrencies (Aug. 16, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.04748. The author’s point here is not
that it is impossible for a lender to ascertain the identity of a pseudonymous
transferee. Rather, as the text attempts to make clear, the author is suggesting
only that the costs and limited reliability of de-anonymization will make it far
more difficult (and less certain) to pursue a pseudonymous transferee than it
would have been to pursue the original borrower.
22. Again, pseudonymity is not inherent in blockchain technology. It would be
easy to establish a blockchain in which transfers were limited to a specified list
of registered and thus identifiable entities.
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In this particular case, a simple answer is apparent on the face of the
revised Article 9 in the various transactional forms it offers as acceptable
means of gaining “control” of the assets in which a lender can perfect by
control.23 As mentioned above, the 1999 revisions use control as an analogue
for possession of certain intangible assets for which possession is categori-
cally impracticable.24 Specifically, for a set of widely used intangible finan-
cial assets, Article 9 offers control as an alternate method of perfection in
addition to (or in the place of) filing.25
Importantly, the provisions for perfection by control build on the tradi-
tion that possession is the baseline method of perfection for financial assets,26
and thus the notion that perfection by control is not only available, but also
superior to, perfection by filing, generally carries forward into the realm of
intangible financial assets. Thus, in this context at least, perfection by filing
is relegated to a second-class method, primarily useful as a backstop for all-
assets that lenders are unsuccessful in locating and for gaining control of
after-arising financial assets. Specifically, a secured party with control of a
deposit account has priority over a secured party that does not have control;27
a secured party with control of investment property has priority over a se-
23. See U.C.C. § 9-314(a).
24. See, e.g., id. § 8-106 cmt. 7 (explaining that the delineation of control is “de-
signed to supplant the concepts of ‘constructive possession’ and the like”).
25. See id. § 9-314(a) (authorizing perfection by control of deposit accounts, in-
vestment property, letter-of-credit rights, and electronic chattel paper); see
supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text (discussing provisions for perfection
by control and explaining that they do not extend to general intangibles).
26. The relic of that tradition in the modern Article 9 is the provisions in U.C.C.
§§ 9-330 & 9-331 under which a secured party perfected by filing in a promis-
sory note or chattel paper can lose priority to a later-in-time secured party that
perfects by possession of the chattel paper or promissory note. See, e.g.,
STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, JR., SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 420–24 (6th ed. 2016).
27. U.C.C. § 9-327(1); see id. at cmt. 4. Because a secured party cannot perfect in
a deposit account by filing (U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(1)), the only competing secured
party would be a secured party perfected in the deposit account as proceeds of
other collateral in which the secured party had a perfected security interest. See
id. § 9-315(a)(2), (c), (d)(2) (providing that a security interest attaches to and is
perfected in any identifiable proceeds of collateral in which a lender was per-
fected at the relevant time, and that the perfection continues indefinitely if the
collateral is cash proceeds a term that includes deposit accounts); see also id.
§ 9-312(b) (providing that perfection by control is the only method of perfec-
tion in a deposit account “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Section 9-315(c)
and (d) for proceeds”); see id. at cmt. 5. See generally HARRIS & MOONEY,
supra note 26, at 446–48.
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cured party that does not have control;28 a secured party with control of let-
ter-of-credit rights has priority over a secured party that does not have
control;29 and a secured party with control of electronic chattel paper has the
same rights to priority over a secured party without control as the rights a
secured party with possession of tangible chattel paper has over a secured
party lacking possession of tangible chattel paper.30
In each case in which perfection by control is available, the notion of
control rests on the premise that it is useful to conceive of the asset as a
financial obligation owed from an identifiable party.31 Thus, the deposit ac-
count is an obligation of the financial institution at which the account is lo-
cated; investment property is an obligation of the financial intermediary at
which the account is located (for security entitlements) or of the issuer of the
security (for certificated securities); letter-of-credit rights are an obligation of
the issuer of the letter of credit; and electronic chattel paper is an obligation
of the issuer of the underlying promissory note.32
Although Article 9 offers a separate statutory delineation of the proce-
dures for control of each of the four asset types for which control is available,
the steps for gaining control for three of the four assets33 are broadly similar.
28. U.C.C. § 9-328(1); see id. at cmt. 3 (detailed discussion); HARRIS & MOONEY,
supra note 26, at 441–42.
29. U.C.C. § 9-329(1); see id. § 9-102 at cmt. f (“[A] secured party’s failure to
obtain control (§ 9-107) of a letter-of-credit right supporting collateral may
leave its security interest exposed to a priming interest of a party who does take
control.”); id. at cmt. 2. Because a secured party cannot perfect in letter-of-
credit rights by filing (U.C.C. § 9-312(b)(2)), the most obvious competing se-
cured party would be a secured party automatically perfected in the letter-of-
credit right as a supporting obligation of an account or instrument in which the
secured party perfected by filing or possession. See id. § 9-102(a)(78) & cmt. f
(defining “supporting obligation” to include “letter-of-credit right”); id. § 9-
203(f) (providing that attachment of a security interest in an asset is attachment
in the supporting obligation); id. § 9-308(d) (providing that perfection of a se-
curity interest in an asset perfects a security interest in any supporting obliga-
tion for that collateral); see also id. § 9-312(b)(2) (stating that perfection by
control is the only method of perfection in letter-of-credit rights “except as
otherwise provided in Section 9-308(d)”); id. § 9-312 cmt. 6 (discussing
perfection in letter-of-credit rights as supporting obligations).
30. Id. § 9-330(a)–(b); see id. at cmts. 2 & 4 (discussing “non-temporal priority” to
“promot[e] the negotiability” of chattel paper and discussing problems related
to possession and control).
31. See id. § 9-104(a).
32. See id. § 9-314.
33. As discussed in more detail below, the rules for control of electronic chattel
paper rest on a registry model rather than the asset-obligor model that domi-
nates procedures for deposit accounts, investment property held as security en-
titlements, and letter-of-credit rights. See id. § 9-105.
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Each generally requires a “control agreement” in which the party obligated
on the asset agrees that it will respect instructions from the lender regarding
disposition of the asset. So, in the most routinized case, the deposit account,
the lender can gain control by use of a control agreement with the borrower
and the bank at which the account is located.34 That transaction is so common
that experienced transactors can employ a Model Deposit Account Control
Agreement promulgated by a Joint Task Force of the ABA Business Law
Section.35 The same result flows in the case of investment property (at least if
it is held in the indirect holding system as a security entitlement) from an
agreement between the lender and the securities intermediary.36 In the case of
the letter-of-credit right, a similar procedure gives a lender control “if the
34. Id. § 9-104(a)(2) (providing that a secured party gains control if it obtains an
agreement “that the bank will comply with instructions originated by the se-
cured party directing disposition of the funds in the deposit account without
further consent by the debtor”); see id. at cmt. 3.
35. For detailed discussion, the text of the model agreement, and related forms, see
R. Marshall Grodner et al, Initial Report of the Joint Task Force on Deposit
Account Control Agreements, 61 BUS. L. 745 (2006). For additional details, see
R. Marshall Groner et al, Additional Report, 64 BUS. L. 801 (2009). For a
thoughtful analysis of the agreement from a creditor’s perspective, see Joel F.
Brown, Deconstructing DACA: An Analysis of the Model Deposit Account
Control Agreement, COM. LENDING REV., Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 3.
36. Like much of the framework regarding investment property, the need to inte-
grate Article 9 with the freestanding framework that Article 8 establishes for
securities means that the relatively simple conclusion stated in the text is based
on the interaction of several scattered sections of the U.C.C. First, § 9-106
defers to Article 8 for the delineation of the rules for control of investment
property, providing that a person has control of investment property “as pro-
vided in Section 8-106.” See U.C.C. § 9-106. Section 8-106(d)(2), in turn, pro-
vides that a “purchaser” has control of a securities entitlement if “the securities
intermediary has agreed that it will comply with entitlement orders originated
by the purchaser without further consent by the entitlement holder.” See id.
§ 8-106 cmts. 4 & 7. In this context, the lender qualifies as a purchaser (defin-
ing purchaser as one “that takes by purchase”). See id. § 1-201(b)(29)–(30)
(defining purchase to include “taking by . . . mortgage, pledge, lien, security
interest . . . or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property”);
see id. § 8-106 cmt. 1 (noting that Article 8’s “concept of control plays a key
role in various provisions dealing with the rights of purchasers, including se-
cured parties” (emphasis added)); see id. § 8-102(a)(14)(ii) (the financial insti-
tution holding the account is the securities intermediary). Although it has
considerably less practical significance, a parallel rule applies to uncertificated
securities. Id. § 8-106(c)(2) (control of uncertificated security flowing from
agreement of the issuer “that it will comply with instructions originated by the
[lender] without further consent by the registered owner”); see id. at cmt. 3.
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issuer . . . has consented to an assignment of proceeds of the letter of
credit.”37
Because many participants in the drafting of revised Article 9 doubted
that lenders would regard the control provisions discussed above as suffi-
ciently reliable, the statute includes, in several places, provisions authorizing
a more intrusive method of control, under which the borrower would for-
mally place the asset to be controlled in the name of the lender. Thus, a
secured party can gain control of a borrower’s deposit account if “the secured
party becomes the bank’s customer with respect to the deposit account”;38 of
a security entitlement if it “becomes the entitlement holder”;39 and of elec-
tronic chattel paper “if a system employed for evidencing the transfer of in-
terests in the chattel paper reliably establishes the secured party as the person
to which the chattel paper was assigned.”40
That same procedure provides an obvious model for a transaction in
which the lender might use that method of “quasi-control” to prevent the
borrower from evading the lender’s security interest in cryptocurrency
through a transfer to an untraceably pseudonymous purchaser. Indeed, that
method of control seems tailor-made for Bitcoin and other modern
blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. Early currencies based on “dual-key”
asymmetric cryptography (DigiCash) used a “token” model that depended on
a unique electronic file passed from “hand to hand,” as it were.41 But
37. Id. § 9-107 (incorporating by reference the procedures in U.C.C. § 5-114 that
govern the issuer’s consent to an assignment of proceeds of a letter of credit);
see id. at cmt. 2. The lender’s ability to gain control arguably is easier in this
context than in the contexts discussed above, because the statute does not give
the letter-of-credit issuer the untrammeled right to refuse consent that it gives
the holder of a deposit account or the securities intermediary. Specifically, al-
though an issuer “has no obligation to give . . . its consent to an assignment of
proceeds of a letter of credit, . . . consent may not be unreasonably withheld if
the assignee possesses and exhibits the letter of credit and presentation of the
letter of credit is a condition to honor.” Id. § 5-114(d); see id. at cmt. 3 (ex-
plaining that those rules “follow more closely recognized national and interna-
tional letter of credit practices than did prior law”).
38. Id. § 9-104(a)(3).
39. Id. § 8-106(d)(1); see id. at cmt. 4. Although it has considerably less practical
significance, a parallel rule applies to uncertificated securities. Id. § 8-
106(c)(1) (providing that lender control uncertificated security if “the uncertifi-
cated security is delivered to the [lender]”); id. § 8-301(b)(1) (providing that an
uncertificated security is delivered if “the issuer registers the [lender] as the
registered owner”); see id. at cmt. 3 (discussing delivery of uncertificated
securities).
40. Id. § 9-105(a); see id. at cmts. 2 & 3.
41. See generally Andrew Lothian, E-commerce: Debugging Legacy Legislation,
THE JOURNAL, http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/44-10/1001069.aspx
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
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blockchain-based currencies solve the problem of unauthorized duplication
of the tokens by locating all evidence of ownership in a registry, or ledger,
that provides authoritative evidence of any transaction creating or transfer-
ring an interest in the currency.42
Setting the lender’s specific concern within that framework, the problem
is that even if the lender has a security interest perfected by filing in a block
of Ether (the currency maintained on the Ethereum platform) identified by
the borrower’s public key, application of the borrower’s private key could
authorize a transaction that would transfer that block of currency to the pub-
lic key of a new (and possibly unidentifiable) owner. But with a quasi-control
transaction, the borrower, as a formal matter, could transfer the block of
Ether at the time it grants a security interest to the lender so that it is regis-
tered on the Ethereum blockchain under the lender’s public key in the name
of the lender. With that transaction, it would be impossible to transfer the
Ether further without application of the lender’s private key; if default by the
borrower made liquidation of the collateral appropriate, the lender could pro-
ceed directly by application of its private key to sell the currency to any third
party purchasing it.43
If the form of that transaction sounds startling, the author should men-
tion that for centuries, real estate transactions in many jurisdictions have
been documented with a document that, on its face, transfers full legal title to
42. See generally What is Blockchain Technology?, CBINSIGHTS, https://www
.cbinsights.com/research/what-is-blockchain-technology/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2019).
43. It is difficult to deduce the details of transactional design from websites, but it
appears that lenders currently working in this area may have failed to appreci-
ate the lessons of pseudonymity that the text summarizes. Thus, the principal
detailed example discussed in Xuan-Thao Nguyen’s article in this issue in-
volves an Austin-based startup named Unchained Capital. See generally Xuan-
Thao Nguyen, Lessons from Case Study of Secured Transactions with Bitcoin,
20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). So far as her article dis-
cusses and the website suggests, the lenders seem to take a weak form of quasi-
control in blockchain-based collateral by having the borrower transmit its pri-
vate key into a receptacle from which the lender can retrieve it in the event of a
default. See How It Works, UNCHAINED CAPITAL, https://www.unchained-capi-
tal.com/how_it_works/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (stating only that the bor-
rower must “send collateral to your new loan’s vault address,” not that the
borrower will register any transfer of the collateral directly on the blockchain).
But unless the lender can be sure that the borrower no longer is aware of its
own private key—and it is not obvious how the lender could be sure of that—
the lender would remain exposed to the risk that a disgruntled borrower would
use that private key to transfer the collateral to a pseudonymous (and presuma-
bly irresponsible) purchaser.
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the lender.44 Similarly, in jurisdictions that permit nonjudicial foreclosure of
real estate, it is common to record a document transferring title to the
lender’s attorney, to be held in trust for the lender. To be clear, in many
contexts, the intention of the lender was to use the form of that transfer to
evade applicable rules that specify procedures for foreclosure and otherwise
bar inappropriate “clogs” on the borrower’s ability by repaying the secured
obligation to redeem its collateral free of the lender’s interest.45 It is now well
settled, though, that whatever form the lender’s interest might take—how-
ever absolute the lender’s title might appear on the face of the applicable
documents—the lender in such a transaction receives the rights accorded a
secured lender under the applicable mortgage lending regime and can finally
take ownership of the collateral free of the borrower’s claims only by com-
plying with that regime.46
Although those protective mortgage rules have no application to the
blockchain-based transactions the author discusses here, those concerns
should still pose no problem to the quasi-control transactional form the au-
thor discussed above. For one thing, consistent with practice in the existing
lending transactions that formally place ownership of intangible collateral
(such as deposit accounts and security entitlements) in the name of the
lender, the author would expect the transfer of the blockchain-based currency
to the name of the lender to accompany a conventional security agreement
documenting the transaction as a secured transaction in which the lender
would have not the rights of a full owner of the currency, but rather only the
rights of a secured party under Article 9.
Moreover, even if the lender did not offer such a security agreement,
Article 9 would limit the lender’s interest—albeit full ownership on its
face—to a security interest that the lender could exercise only in accordance
with the procedures (and limitations) that Article 9 prescribes. To use the
language of Article 9, the U.C.C. rules for security interests apply to any
“transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal
property . . . by contract.”47 The comment to that provision explains the point
more expansively: “When a security interest is created, this Article applies
regardless of the form of the transaction or the name that parties have given
it. Likewise, the subjective intent of the parties with respect to the legal char-
44. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Mortgs. § 4.1 cmt. a(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1999) [hereinafter Restatement of Mortgages] (discussing jurisdictions that ad-
here to the “title theory” of mortgages).
45. See, e.g., id. § 3.2 at cmt. a (discussing prohibition on “clogging” the bor-
rower’s “equity of redemption”).
46. See, e.g., id. § 4.1(a) & cmt. a (“A mortgage creates only a security interest in
real estate . . . .”, explaining that even title theory states “recognize that mortga-
gees hold title for security purposes only, and for both practical and theoretical
purposes they usually view the mortgagor as the owner of the land”).
47. U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1).
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acterization of their transaction is irrelevant to whether this Article
applies.”48
In sum, the ability of transactors to take advantage of, more or less,
“off-the-shelf” institutions for protecting a lender’s interest in collateral by
putting title to the collateral in the name of the lender should allow lenders,
with relatively manageable risks to borrowers, to protect themselves from the
risks discussed in the first part of this article.
IV. PERFECTION DIRECTLY ON THE BLOCKCHAIN:
THE PROMISE OF SMART LIENS
The “quasi-control” strategy discussed above has salient advantages
over simple perfection by filing, specifically because it gives the lender a
more practically efficacious interest in the promised collateral, while at the
same time relying on conventional transactional forms. Having said that, it
must be acknowledged that it is far from an elegant solution—it obligates
borrowers to execute documents designed to have legal effects remote from
their stated terms. It seems ironic that we should struggle in transactions in-
volving new asset forms based directly on developing technology to break
free of Restoration-Era transactional forms.
From that perspective, it seems only proper that an effort to design
transactions for blockchain-registered assets like crypto-currencies should at
least undertake to rely on some of the attributes of the blockchain that prom-
ise to give it significance far beyond the no-longer-novel Bitcoin application.
Specifically, the transaction at hand seems a natural fit for a blockchain-
based “smart” contract application. Two questions arise: how to design such
an arrangement and whether it would be attractive enough to attract common
use by transactors.
A. How Would You Build a “Smart” Lien?
In this context, a “smart” contract is a contract that relies on software to
execute a transaction in response to prearranged conditions.49 Although the
technology dates to the last century,50 several inherent limitations have
48. Id. at cmt. 2.
49. See, e.g., Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. TECH.
L. REV. 305, 320–21 (2017); Lin Cong & Zhiguo He, Blockchain Disruption
and Smart Contracts (Sep. 10, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2985764; “Smart Contracts” Legal Primer, CHAMBER OF DIGITAL
COM., https://digitalchamber.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Smart-Contracts-
Legal-Primer-02.01.2018.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
50. The idea of the smart contract traditionally is attributed to Nick Szabo. See
Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks,
FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997), http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/
548/469 (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
2018] Reliable Perfection of Security Interests in Crypto-Currency 173
slowed its adoption.51 Most obviously, because it depends on the execution
of software code, it can work to execute a contract only if the actions to be
completed on both sides of the contract can be reduced to objective attributes
identifiable or executable by computer.52 In modern contemplation, which
situates smart contracts on the blockchain, the actions of the contracting par-
ties must be demonstrable to (or executable by) the distributed consensus of
the blockchain.53 Thus, in the simplest model, an objective indicator of con-
tract performance by a seller or service provider could produce an automated
transfer of the appropriate funds from a purchaser.54 The idea that the use of
objective proxies for contract performance could automate the payment pro-
cess is not a new one.55 It is, for example, the foundation of the traditional
letter-of-credit transaction, which unambiguously obligates a financial insti-
tution to make an immediate payment upon presentation of objectively speci-
fied documents, designed to serve as an adequate proxy of the counterparty’s
contractual performance.56 For that reason, it should be no surprise that
cross-border trade finance, where centuries of letter-of-credit practices have
developed a staple of routinely accepted documentary proxies for contractual
performance, should be one of the most promising frontiers for the develop-
ment of smart contracts.57
51. See generally Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Con-
tracts and Their Potential and Inherent Limitations, HARV. L. SCH. FOR. ON






55. See generally RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 349–93 (6th ed. 2016).
56. Id.
57. See, e.g., ICC BANKING COMM’N, RETHINKING TRADE & FINANCE 60–63,
230–32 (2017), https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/06/2017-
rethinking-trade-finance.pdf; LATA VARGHESE & RASHI GOYAL, HOW
BLOCKCHAIN CAN REVITALIZE TRADE FINANCE (PART 1) (2017), https://www
.cognizant.com/whitepapers/how-blockchain-can-revitalize-trade-finance-part
1-codex2766.pdf; LATA VARGHESE & RASHI GOYAL, BLOCKCHAIN FOR TRADE
FINANCE: PAYMENT METHOD AUTOMATION (PART 2) (2017), https://www.cog-
nizant.com/whitepapers/how-blockchain-can-revitalize-trade-finance-part1-co-
dex2766.pdf; LATA VARGHESE & RASHI GOYAL, BLOCKCHAIN FOR TRADE
FINANCE: TRADE ASSET TOKENIZATION (PART 3) (2018), https://www.cogni-
zant.com/whitepapers/blockchain-for-trade-finance-trade-asset-tokenization-
part-3-codex3337.pdf; see also Sumeet Chatterjee, HSBC Says Performs First
Trade Finance Deal Using Single Blockchain System, REUTERS (May 13,
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-blockchain/hsbc-says-per-
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Having said that, the structure of the transaction at hand—collateraliz-
ing a blockchain-based cryptocurrency—is in several ways ideal for smart
contracting. Most obviously, both sides of transaction performance are well-
suited to blockchain-based verification. Consider first the borrower’s future
obligation: payment of a sum of money. That is easily settled by having the
required payment made in a blockchain-based currency; by submitting the
relevant transaction details, the borrower could demonstrate to the relevant
distributed ledger community that the payment had been made. Conversely,
consider the lender’s side of the transaction: foreclosure on the collateral in
the event of nonpayment. The smart contract need only stipulate that the
collateral would be transferred to the lender automatically on the appropriate
date if the borrower had not by that date submitted the requisite evidence of
payment.
Interestingly, the use of smart contracts to execute secured transactions
was one of the original examples offered in Nick Szabo’s seminal 1997 pa-
per.58 Specifically, he suggested its use to replicate repossession in the auto-
mobile-lending context.59 There, upon a failure of payment, the contract
would “return control of the car keys to the bank.”60 Technology to accom-
plish that feat—remotely incapacitating the debtor’s ability to start the vehi-
cle—certainly did not exist in 199761 and even now remains a bit out of
reach.62 By contrast, the steps necessary to effectuate crypto-currency col-
forms-first-trade-finance-deal-using-single-blockchain-system-idUSKCN1IF
01X (describing the first trade finance deal using a shared blockchain system).
58. Szabo, supra note 50.
59. Szabo, supra note 50.
60. Szabo, supra note 50.
61. Szabo, of course, recognized this. The prescience of his explanation of how we
might “more fully embed in a property the contractual terms which deal with
it” is notable:
These protocols would give control of the cryptographic keys for operat-
ing the property to the person who rightfully owns that property, based on
the terms of the contract. In the most straightforward implementation, the
car can be rendered inoperable unless the proper challenge-response proto-
col is completed with its rightful owner, preventing theft. But if the car is
being used to secure credit, strong security implemented in this traditional
way would create a headache for the creditor—the repo man would no
longer be able to confiscate a deadbeat’s car. To redress this problem, we
can create a smart lien protocol: if the owner fails to make payments, the
smart contract invokes the lien protocol, which returns control of the car
keys to the bank.
Szabo, supra note 50.
62. Only a bit. Recent developments in the “internet of things” realm suggest that
cars, in the next few years, will include technology sufficient to make payments
directly from the car. See Connected Cars and Cards, NILSON REP. 7, 7–8
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lateralization both can be completed directly on the blockchain itself, without
any need to develop electronic proxies for meatspace activity.
To be sure, a few additional tweaks are necessary to replicate the tradi-
tional lien transaction. Most obviously, the contract also needs to include
code to vitiate the lender’s interest if the borrower in fact makes the required
payments.63 Thus, just as the lien would ripen into full title if the borrower
fails to make the required stream of payments, the lien would evaporate,
returning full and unencumbered title to the borrower if the borrower did in
fact make the required stream of payments.
More generally, for the transaction to attract mainstream lenders, it
should be adapted to function with payments made in conventional currency
as opposed to blockchain-based currency. That is particularly true if, as
seems likely, the principal context in which blockchain-based currency is
useful as collateral is in “all-assets” transactions, in which lenders seek an
interest in the blockchain-based currency simply because it represents a cog-
nizable portion of the borrower’s balance sheet.64 The volatile prices of
blockchain-based currency suggest that they would be much less valuable as
collateral in asset-specific lending contexts, especially given the substantial
likelihood that its value would decline markedly during the term of a loan.65
Once the transaction involves payments in conventional currency, the prob-
lem arises that the payment (or lack of payment) is not an act directly appar-
ent on the blockchain.66 Thus, some blockchain-verifiable event needs to be
devised as a proxy for the actual payment.
One simple approach would insert a trusted third party into the transac-
tion, obligating the third party to record a notice on the relevant blockchain
to indicate the presence—or absence—of each payment. Using arrangements
(Nov. 2016) (discussing developing procedures for provisioning payment to-
kens into applications embedded in automobiles); Jaguar Test-Drives Embed-
ded Payments, PYMNTS.COM (Feb. 15, 2017), http://www.pymnts.com/news/
mobile-payments/2017/jaguar-test-drives-embedded-payments/ (adjustment of
that technology to use the connectivity to disable the vehicle seems a trivial
extension).
63. Szabo recognized that little detail even in his summary sketch. See Szabo,
supra note 50 (“A further reification would provably [sic] remove the lien
when the loan has been paid off.”).
64. See, e.g., AnnaMaria Andriotis & Paul Vigna, Credit Card Companies Don’t
Want You to Buy Bitcoin With Plastic, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2018), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/should-you-buy-bitcoin-with-your-credit-card-15168970
97.
65. Indeed, Bitcoin has been so volatile that major credit card issuers have stopped
allowing cardholders to purchase bitcoin with a credit card, even though the
lenders in those transactions get no interest at all in the collateral. See id.
66. Michael Crosby et al., BlockChain Technology, SUTARDJA CTR. FOR ENTREPRE-
NEURSHIP & TECH. 3 (2015), https://scet.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/
BlockchainPaper.pdf.
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akin to those for an escrow agent, the parties could arrange for each payment
to pass through the third party, with the third party then providing notice on
the blockchain regarding the propriety of each required payment. If the no-
tice were “signed” with the agent’s indicated private key, it would be ac-
cepted as a new block on the chain; under the terms of the smart contract, the
notice either would or would not trigger the responses indicated (such as a
transfer of the collateral to defray any outstanding balance of the obligation)
in the event of default.
In sum, it easily should be within the technological reach of existing
techniques to integrate the traditional attributes of a lien into a smart contract.
B. If We Build It, Will They Come?
The natural question, then, is whether any substantial group of commer-
cial transactors would use a smart lien if the basic building blocks described
above were designed and implemented on one of the major blockchains. The
author’s strong impression is that the answer is yes, but only (at least at first)
within the niche for all-assets lending to large businesses. The author can
start with explaining why he thinks the smart lien is ill-suited to other con-
texts before explaining why he thinks it would be not only effective but also
attractive within that particular niche.
On the first point, the author noted above why a lien on cryptocurrency
is more likely to make sense in the context of all-assets lending as opposed to
purchase-money or other lending founded on advances made against the
value of specific assets.67 Those transactions typically cap their funding at a
specified percentage of the purchase price of the asset at the time of the loan
(often in the range of 75–80%).68 For asset classes that have relatively stable
values, the likelihood of a price decline that exceeds twenty percent might be
relatively small; in that case, the lender’s credit losses would be relatively
slight, without regard to the personal creditworthiness of the borrower.69
The inflexibility of the enforcement structure also makes the smart lien
ill-suited to loans in which relational or other considerations might make a
pre-arranged and automated execution on collateral precipitous. It is one
thing for a publicly traded company to suffer a catastrophic loss from its
balance sheet the day after it fails to make a quarterly payment on one of its
bond issues. For smaller and middle-market borrowers, though, there is a
67. See Andriotis & Vigna, supra note 64.
68. Cf. Eric B. Garfield & Matthew T. VanEck, Cap Rate Calculation, CERTIFIED
COM. INV. MEMBER INST., https://www.ccim.com/cire-magazine/articles/cap-
rate-calculations/?gmSsoPc=1 (discussing how cap rates are calculated in the
real estate market).
69. To be sure, home-mortgage lenders in the first decade of this century com-
monly lent up to 90% or even 100% (or more) of the purchase price of the
home. Even at the time, though, few experienced lenders regarded those trans-
actions as prudent.
2018] Reliable Perfection of Security Interests in Crypto-Currency 177
much greater likelihood that transactors will negotiate for notice or grace
periods, or perhaps for an opportunity to cure defaults before the exercise of
remedies by the lender. More broadly, even in transactions in which the par-
ties have not negotiated for such things, there might be a sense that the
lender’s duty of good faith and fair dealing obligates it to provide such
things, at least in some circumstances. To put it another way, the inflexible
enforcement structure makes sense only in contexts in which it is sensible to
believe that the borrower should be understood, in a practical and effective
way, as agreeing without qualification or reservation to an immediate and
irrevocable disposition of the collateral instantaneously upon a single pay-
ment default.70
The last question, then, is to consider whether the transaction would be
attractive within the milieu identified above: all-assets lending for relatively
large business borrowers. Although any discussion is speculative, several
overlapping reasons persuade that the transaction would be attractive. The
first is the most speculative, but also probably the most important: the likeli-
hood that blockchain-based currencies of one form or another will become a
bigger share of the balance sheet of businesses in the years to come.
The history of secured credit in the United States over the last century
has been a history of shifts in the balance sheets of businesses followed by
innovations in the practice and law of secured credit to ensure that lenders
can obtain a reliable security interest. To offer just the most obvious exam-
ples, compare the ease of perfecting blanket liens in accounts receivable
under Article 9 with the mélange of imperfect remedies available in earlier
years under the scattered state-law regimes;71 the ease of third-party perfec-
tion in deposit and securities accounts under the revised Article 9 with prac-
tice under the original Article 9;72 and the development over the last two
decades of institutions to perfect securities interests in intellectual property,
responding to the increased importance of intellectual property on business
70. That is not to say that the smart lien could not be crafted to accommodate some
or all of the features of more flexible arrangements. For example, it would not
be difficult, using the mechanisms summarized above, to grant a grace period
or a right of notice and opportunity to cure. In common practice, though, those
mechanisms tend to occur in environments in which transactors are more likely
to conceive of a correlative flexibility in the ultimate enforcement of the rem-
edy than the idea of the smart lien contemplates; it is not nearly so easy to
design a software-coded instantiation of the kind of flexibility or forgiveness
that would be contemplated by challenges arising under a duty of good faith
and fair dealing.
71. See GILMORE, supra note 12, at 128–45, 196–249, 250–86.
72. Compare, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-314 (discussing perfection by control), with GIL-
MORE, supra note 12, § 10.7 (discussing transactions excluded under U.C.C.
§ 9-104).
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balance sheets.73 If blockchain-based currencies continue to increase in com-
mercial significance, the pressure for effective mechanisms of perfection will
be compelling.
That pressure would motivate the development of smart contracts to fa-
cilitate lending against blockchain-based currencies only if there is some-
thing markedly advantageous about those transactions, and the author thinks
there is. The most obvious reason is the one summarized above, that imple-
mentation of the transactions at the blockchain level would be less
“clunky”—more elegant—than the circuitous use of quasi-control discussed
in the preceding section. But the author does not think that the point of ele-
gance standing alone would go far—after all, elegance of transactional de-
sign is certainly of more interest to theorists and academics than it is to
borrowers and lenders, who are primarily interested in documenting, as
cheaply as possible, a transaction that comes as close as possible to enforcing
their shared agreement.
The discussion above, though, shows one obvious advantage that the
smart contract approach would have over the quasi-control approach: limit-
ing borrower concerns about lender opportunism (clogging). Specifically, be-
cause the quasi-control arrangement puts formal ownership of the
blockchain-based currency in the name of the lender, the lender is in a posi-
tion, at least as a matter of raw power, to dispose of the collateral without the
borrower’s consent or even over the borrower’s objection.74 That is particu-
larly problematic in all-assets transactions in which the borrower typically
will be free to buy and sell assets of particular types, subject only to conven-
tional limitations designed to prevent transactions outside the ordinary course
of the borrower’s routine business. Thus, for a borrower that happens to own
some blockchain-based currency, which is not the central focus of the bor-
rower’s balance sheet, a transfer of title to the lender might seem particularly
objectionable, insofar as it would require the borrower to obtain a release
(and reconveyance) from the lender to affect any transaction involving the
currency in question.
To be sure, the simplistic smart contract arrangement discussed above
would not leave the borrower the same freedom to convey blockchain-based
currency that it might have under a conventional all-assets security agree-
ment, but replicating the convenience of that freedom in the blockchain-
based smart contract should be trivially easy. To discuss just a few of the
most common arrangements without working through all the bells and
whistles, the smart lien could provide, for example, that the borrower, with-
out any constraint, could transfer a specified amount of the currency during
73. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 COR-
NELL L. REV. 134, 187 (1999); MANN, supra note 14, at 158–92 (discussing
perfection of security interests in copyright and patents); Xuan-Thao Nguyen,
Financing Innovation: Legal Development of Intellectual Property as Security
in Financing: 1845–2014, 48 IND. L. REV. 509 (2015).
74. See How It Works, supra note 43.
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any single time period. Conversely, it could provide that the lender could
record a notice of default on the blockchain that would terminate any right of
the borrower to transfer any of the currency until resolution of the alleged
default.
You might ask yourself why an aspect of the transaction that makes it
more attractive to the borrower should make adoption of the transaction more
likely. After all, if we conceive of a transaction design as a zero-sum game,
then any shift to make the transaction more palatable to one party necessarily
makes it less palatable to the other. But transaction design is not a zero-sum
game. The author works from the perspective that the inefficiencies of doctri-
nal rules and judicial enforcement generally make it impossible for the par-
ties to document a transaction that perfectly replicates whatever their shared
agreement might be. That is particularly true in the context of secured lend-
ing, because the law in that context has such a pervasive overlay of bor-
rower-protective concerns that place a wide variety of arrangements to which
well-informed parties might agree completely off the table.75 From that per-
spective, arrangements that reassure the parties about the consonance of the
practical effect of the agreement and the shared agreement of the parties can
improve the attractiveness of the arrangements for both sides of the
transaction.
For the reasons discussed above, this arrangement should provide con-
siderable reassurance to borrowers about the potential for malfeasance by
lenders related to the borrower’s collateral, lessening the amount of trust that
is necessary for borrowers to find the transactions acceptable. In the same
vein, if effectively implemented, the smart lien should lessen the transac-
tional burden, as compared to a quasi-control transaction, for the borrower’s
dealings with blockchain-based assets that it would be free to convey under
the terms of the security agreement. The author’s sense, based on interactions
with borrowers, is that those effects would be regarded as substantial, if not
affirmatively important.
At the same time, the author doubts that most lenders—at least the insti-
tutional lenders likely to be involved in transactions of this size and charac-
ter—would enter into the transaction with an expectation that they would
engage in those activities profitably in any event.76 If so, they would not
regard it as a significant cost to enter into a transaction, the design of which
75. MANN, supra note 14, at 77–101 (discussing rules that recharacterize transac-
tions to treat them as secured transactions); MANN, supra note 14, 237–87 (dis-
cussing rules limiting the arrangements to which the parties can agree for
disposition of collateral after default).
76. That might be true because of a perception that it would harm the lender’s
reputation to act opportunistically, because of concerns that the costs of litiga-
tion (including possibly supra-compensatory legal remedies available to bor-
rowers) ultimately would undermine the profitability of opportunistic action
against the collateral, or even because of a sense that the activity is “wrong” or
“unfair.”
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foreclosed those routes for opportunism. To put it another way, the well-
designed smart contract could, at least potentially, increase transactional sur-
plus by providing a mechanism for the lender willing to enter it to provide a
credible signal that the lender has no interest in undue trammeling of the
borrower’s ability to deal with its assets during the term of the loan.
Conversely, the automation of the remedial process that comes with the
smart lien could make the transaction more attractive to lenders in important
ways. As discussed above, the smart lien would be problematic in relational
lending transactions that involved a substantial amount of give and take be-
tween the parties, or in smaller transactions in which the parties (or courts)
would expect flexibility or deliberation in the remedial process. But the bor-
rower’s willingness to enter into a transaction with a smart lien provides a
signal to the lender that the borrower is willing to accept the draconian con-
sequence that would flow from default on a smart-lien secured transaction:
automated disposition of the collateral at the then-current market value. To
be sure, the benefits from that signal might be slight. Because the conse-
quences of default ordinarily are catastrophic and immediate in the large-
dollar lending contexts for which the author thinks the transaction is suited,
the willingness of a borrower to extend that treatment to whatever
blockchain-based currency it might own is probably expected. Still, the avail-
ability, and acceptability, of an effective remedy should play some role in
making the transaction more attractive.
V. CONCLUSION
As the author neared the end of this article, he became increasingly con-
cerned about the high dose of speculation, much of which is far removed
from the kind of solid empirical backing to which the author aspires in his
work. But on reflection, the author came to appreciate the value of the specu-
lative tone. Speculation is inherent in the design of this project—assessing
the prospects for transactions that do not yet commonly occur. The author
applauds the foresight of the editors for putting together a panel on the sub-
ject of collateralizing crypto-currencies, because it has induced this specula-
tion. There is something special, almost exciting, about this effort to analyze
potential structures for transactions that are likely to be routine in a few short
decades, a sense of being in “on the ground floor.” The author looks forward
to seeing those developments as they unfold in the years to come, even as he
recognizes how unlikely it is that they will track closely with the introductory
thoughts the author offers in the preceding pages.
